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Abstract:  
This paper explores the political determinants of societies’ tolerance for social 
exclusion on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or race. We develop a political-economic 
model of social exclusion with three main features. First, each individual living in this 
society must submit a political proposal regarding the extent to which society must 
tolerate social exclusion. Second, depending on the realized degree of society’s 
tolerance for social exclusion, each population group comprising the society must 
decide on how much resources to expend in order to exclude rival groups from, or 
include its members in, the public allocation of education resources. Third, allocation 
of resources to participation in the exclusion contest trades off private investment in 
child’s human capital. To the extent that population size is, at least initially, the only 
source of asymmetry between rival groups, our analysis suggests that the 
introduction of democratic voting may not be sufficient to save small, but visible, 
minorities from social exclusion. Only where this asymmetry is moderate, can the 
introduction of democratic voting suffice to eliminate social exclusion. 
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I. Introduction
In public discussions of the role of institutions in the process of development, the intro-
duction of democratic voting is often seen as a panacea—a cure for all social ills. Social
exclusion1, however, is a problem faced by democracies and dictatorships alike (William
Easterly and Ross Levine [1997]; Alberto Alesina, William Easterly, and Reza Baqir [1999],
Mark Gradstein and Moshe Justman [2002]). Consider a heterogenous society, where pop-
ulation groups are polarized along ethnic, religious or racial lines. Whether individuals
comprising such a society will have equal access to the constituents of welfare, regardless
of their population group of aﬃliation, may therefore depend on whether social exclusion
is tolerated. A necessary condition for social exclusion to be tolerated is that politicians
have ethnic, racial, or religious-based constituencies, which may lead to the exclusion of the
politically dominated population groups from the constituents of welfare. It is not there-
fore surprising that such exclusion has been shown to have a negative eﬀect on economic
growth (William Easterly and Ross Levine [1997]; Mark Gradstein and Moshe Justman
[2002]), and to lead to an unequal distribution of wealth across population groups (Mark
Gradstein and Maurice Schiﬀ [2006]). Why is this phenomenon tolerated in some soci-
eties? More importantly, if population groups comprising a heterogenous society were to
vote democratically on the extent to which their society must tolerate exclusion on the
basis of ethnicity, religion, or race, what would be the outcome of this vote and why?2
Under what conditions does democratic voting eliminate social exclusion? These are the
questions we address in this paper.
Basic economic theory of social exclusion or marginalization reveals that participating
in the exclusion contest entails costs, not just benefits, to the participants (Mark Grad-
1In this paper social exclusion refers to the exclusion of rival social groups from the constituents of
welfare on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity, for example. Indicators of social exclusion relate to
economic activity, employment, housing, health, and other factors.
2Observe that voting on the extent of social exclusion may, in reality, take the form of a referendum
whereby citizens of a heterogenous society must choose between two political systems: a proportional
representation system that is highly inclusive, and a majoritarian system that favors exclusion (see, for
example, Marta Reynal-Querol [2004]).
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stein [2003]; Jose G. Montalvoa, and Marta Reynal-Querol [2005]). By backward induction,
therefore, one would expect a population group to support tolerance of social marginaliza-
tion of rival groups only if, for members of that group, the benefits of socially marginalizing
others outweigh its costs. The costs of marginalizing others may take the form of resources
(time and/or money) members of a population group must expend in order to block ri-
val groups’ access to publicly provided resources such as health services, education (e.g.,
Mark Gradstein [2003]), or to public goods (e.g., Alberto Alesina, William Easterly, and
Reza Baqir [1999]). The benefits may be measured, for instance, in terms of the share
of existing public resources this group can capture for the exclusive use of its members
(e.g., Mark Gradstein [2003]). In this paper, we develop a political-economic model of
population groups competition for education resources with three main features. First,
each individual living in this society must submit a political proposal regarding the extent
to which society must tolerate social exclusion. Second, depending on the realized degree
of society’s tolerance for social exclusion, each population group comprising the society
must decide on how much resources to expend in order to exclude rival groups from public
allocation of education resources. Third, allocation of resources to participation in the
exclusion contest trades oﬀ private investment in child’s human capital.
Within each population group, members correctly anticipate that, if selected, their
political proposal on the extent of society’s tolerance for social exclusion will have an eﬀect
on the intensity of the exclusion contest. Therefore, we first characterize the outcome
of the exclusion contest as a Nash-Equilibrium of a non-cooperative game between rival
groups, given the realized degree of tolerance for social exclusion. Depending upon his
population group of aﬃliation, and depending upon the outcome of the exclusion contest,
each individual then receives a payoﬀ from living in a society with degree of tolerance, say
δ, for social exclusion. In a political equilibrium with democratic voting over the level of
δ, each individual then chooses the political proposal, δ, that maximizes this payoﬀ.
We use this political-economic framework to argue that in a context where individuals
are allowed to vote democratically on the extent of society’s tolerance for social exclusion,
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if population groups are either symmetric in exclusion power–or, when they are asymmet-
ric, the degree of inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is relatively moderate–, then
no population group gains from supporting tolerance of social exclusion. Only in societies
where the inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is suﬃciently large, would the more
powerful group gain from supporting tolerance of social exclusion. The analysis therefore
suggests that democratization in socially heterogenous countries, with relatively low level
of population group asymmetry in exclusion power, can be suﬃcient to eliminate social
exclusion or marginalization. However, in societies where such asymmetry is suﬃciently
large, the introduction of democratic voting may not be suﬃcient. In that context, a nec-
essary and suﬃcient condition for social exclusion to be eliminated is that the introduction
of democratic voting be combined with an appropriately designed immigration policy that
reduces the relative exclusion power of the majority group.
There is an extensive economics literature focusing on the eﬀects of social heterogene-
ity on the basis of race (e.g., Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir and William Easterly [1999]),
ethnicity and religion (e.g., William Easterly and Ross Levine [1997]; Mark Gradstein and
Moshe Justman [2002]; Mark Gradstein [2003]; Jose G. Montalvoa, and Marta Reynal-
Querol [2005]). Alesina, Baqir and Easterly [1999] show that racial heterogeneity has a
negative eﬀect on the provision of public goods in the United States. Easterly and Levine
[1997] show that ethnic divisions have a negative impact on the economic growth of African
countries, because of their association with low educational attainments. Gradstein and
Justman [2002] find that decentralized and segregated education in which diﬀerent popula-
tion groups3 separately run uncoordinated school systems has a negative eﬀect on growth.
In an empirical study of ethnolinguistic diversity, Montalvoa and Reynal-Querol [2005]
argue that ethnic (religious) polarization has a large, negative, eﬀect on economic devel-
opment, because it reduces investment while increasing government consumption and the
probability of a civil conflict.
The common point of contributions in the above literature is that they all focus on
3In their case, ethnicity and religion are candidate sources of population heterogeneity.
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the eﬀects of social marginalization, and not on its political determinants. A notable
exception is Mark Gradstein [2003] and most recently Mark Gradstein and Maurice Schiﬀ
[2006]. Gradstein [2003] studies the political determinants of social exclusion in the case of
multiple groups diﬀerentiated by race, religion, or ethnicity. He finds that in the presence
of within-group human capital spillovers, social exclusion may win the majority’s support.
It is important to note that in Mark Gradstein [2003], households do not explicitly
have the option to supplement public education resources with private resources, so that
if parental altruism is suﬃciently high, the benefits of exclusion–which include human
capital spillovers between members of the majority–will always outweigh its costs. In our
model, social exclusion can obtain as a political outcome, even in the absence of human
capital spillovers, as long as investment in a child’s human capital has both a public as
well as a private component–which is well documented (e.g., Edward L. Glaeser [1994]).4
Therefore, while Gradstein [2003] emphasizes the presence of within-group human capital
externalities as an important determinant of political support for social exclusion in a
democracy, we, in contrast, emphasize the trade oﬀ between the cost of excluding rival
population groups and household private investment in oﬀspring’s human capital formation.
The distinguishing feature of our model is that each household has the option to supplement
public education resources with a private investment in his oﬀspring human capital, so
that private resources allocated to the exclusion contest trade oﬀ parental investment in
human capital. This feature of our model formalizes the degree of inter-group asymmetry
in exclusion power (as measured, for example, by the degree of asymmetry in population
size) as an important determining factor of the positive association between democratic
voting and political support for social exclusion. Indeed, for each population group, the
per capita cost of exclusion is increasing in the relative size of the rival group. We show
that in that environment, social exclusion can still obtain as a political outcome.
Our research is more closely related to a recently published work by Mark Gradstein
4When there is public investment in child’s human capital, private, parental investment may include
the purchase of home-based learning devices such as computers, or the financing of private tutoring for
the child.
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and Maurice Schiﬀ [2006]. Gradstein and Schiﬀ [2006] build a model in which exclusion
of the minority is the preferred strategy for the majority, and study conditions under
which society can gradually progress towards social inclusion of the minority. Two main
features distinguish our model from Gradstein and Schiﬀ [2006]. First, in their model
only members of the minority, excluded from sharing in on publicly financed education
resources, privately invest in their oﬀspring’s human capital formation. This implies that
for the majority, public education completely crowds out parental private contribution
to a child’s human capital formation. We relax this assumption in our model. Indeed,
in our model, both the majority and the minority have the option to supplement public
education with private investment in their oﬀspring’s human capital formation. Relaxing
this assumption allows us to endogenize the threat of rebellion or secession by the minority.
Second, in Gradstein and Schiﬀ [2006], the credibility of the threat of rebellion by
the minority is exogenously given. When this threat is suﬃciently credible, the majority
withdraws its support for social exclusion, and inclusion of the minority takes place. Only
when this threat is incredible can social exclusion obtain and persist as a political outcome.
In Gradstein and Schiﬀ [2006], no explicit consideration is given to the determinants of
the credibility of this threat. Suppose as in Gradstein and Schiﬀ that the minority can
threaten to secede if their oﬀspring are not included in the public allocation of education
resources. On one hand, one would expect the minority to take a collective action aimed
at establishing the credibility of their threat of secession. For example, they can expend
their own resources in order to gain international legitimacy for their secession project;
or they may invest in gathering legal resources necessary to justify their right to self-
determination.5 This, in turn, will raise the credibility of their threat of secession in the
eyes of the majority group. On the other hand, anticipating such action by the minority, the
majority group may, in response, undertake a collective action aimed at undermining the
legitimacy of the minority’s secession project. They may, for example, finance diplomatic
missions abroad aimed at exposing the flaws of the minority’s secession project, which, in
5This may include exposing internationally the human injustice or exploitation they face in the larger
multi-ethnic, or multi-religious state.
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turn, may reduce the threat of secession by the minority. This action and reaction process
is best described, as we show in this paper, as a non-cooperative secession or rebellion
game. In such an environment, exclusion of the minority will obtain political support only
if the majority has enough resources to undermine the credibility of rebellion or secession
by the minority. Otherwise, social inclusion will take place. Unlike in Gradstein and
Schiﬀ [2006], therefore, we demonstrate (and do not simply assume) that the majority
needs to be suﬃciently dominant in order to succeed in undermining the credibility of
the minority’s threat of secession. We model the economic gains from supporting social
exclusion as the level of welfare attained by an individual living in a society that has a
degree, δ, of tolerance for social exclusion. We show that whether or not the majority gains
economically by excluding the minority depends upon the extent of the majority’s exclusion
power—including its ability to undermine the threat of rebellion by the minority. To the
extent that population size is, at least initially, the only source of asymmetry between
rival groups, our analysis suggests that the introduction of democratic voting may not be
suﬃcient to save small, but visible, minorities from social exclusion. This is because for
very small minorities, the threat of secession or rebellion is not credible.
Marta Reynal-Querol [2004] also develops a model that has the potential to inform
the debate on the determinants of society’s tolerance social exclusion. Her model implies
that where social exclusion is tolerated, it must be that the prevailing political system is a
majoritarian democracy, which tends to foster social exclusion in societies where politicians
have social group-based constituencies. A move toward social inclusion may therefore
involve, in such societies, a change from a political system based on majority ruling, to one
based on proportional representation, which favors a high degree of inclusiveness. While she
focuses on the comparative performance of each of the two political systems in preempting
civil wars, we, in contrast, focus on the determinants of the society’s choice for either
system.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
This model is solved in section 3. Finally section 4 provides concluding remarks.
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II. Model
Consider an economy in which individuals diﬀer primarily with respect to their ethnicity,
or race, or religion. The economy lasts for two periods. Citizens of this economy are
divided into N population groups, indexed by j, where j = 1, ..., N , (N ≥ 2). We denote
as nj ∈ (0, 1) the relative size of population group j, with n1 + n2 + .... + nN = 1.
Groups can be ethnic, religious, or racial-based, and we attach no particular attention to
any of the three possible interpretations. Individuals are homogenous within each group.
Decisionmakers are altruistic parents, who each have custody of a single child, who makes
no decision. Parental altruism is limited to the extent to which a parent cares about her
child’s education, or human capital level.
We denote as h1j , the human capital level of an adult member of population group j.
We take this human capital level as a proxy for her labor income. A child’s only activity
is to accumulate human capital, the level of which depends on the quality of education
received. Investment in child’s education has two sources: a private source and a public
source. The level of parental investment in child’s education is denoted as eij, while the
level of public investment in a child’s human capital is denoted as θij. Thus, the human
capital level of a child whose parent i (i ∈ [0, nj]) belongs to population group j is given
by:
h2ij = Deij + θij, D ∈ (0, 1) (II.1)
where D denotes the exogenously given relative productivity of parental investment in
child’s education.6 Observe that since public investment in education substitutes for
parental investment, such investment will not be socially desirable unless D < 1, i.e.,
the productivity of parental investment in child’s education is lower than that of public
investment in education. We motivate public investment in this environment by the as-
6The assumption of perfect substitution between the private and the public component of human
capital investment is made without loss of generality. Imperfect substitution (a la Cobb Douglas) further
complicates the exposition without any new qualitative insight. Furthermore, the assumption of perfect
substitution between human capital inputs is not restricted to our analysis. A similar assumption is made
by Gary S Becker, Kevin Murphy, and Robert Tamura [1990].
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sumption that D ∈ (0, 1), so that public investment in education has the potential to
enhance economic growth.7
Public funds, θ, allocated to public investment in education are financed by an exoge-
nously given income tax levied on all parents, at a proportional rate t ∈ [0, 1). Assuming
balanced government budget, the level of public funds allocated to public investment in
education is given by
θ = t
NX
j=1
njh
1
j ≡ th¯1. (II.2)
Again to keep the focus on social exclusion of rival population groups, let us normal-
ize household consumption to 0, so that each household’s essential decision is restricted
to investment in child education, so as to maximize the child’s human capital. Assume
population groups compete against one another for a larger share of public investment in
education. Thus, following Mark Gradstein [2003], each population group j expends an
amount xj to finance a group-specific collective eﬀort to exclude rival population groups
from, or including members of of the group in, the allocation of public education resources.
In the case where there are only two population groups, say, a majority group (M) and
a minority group (m), one can think of xm for example, as resource expended by the mi-
nority in order to increase the credibility of their of rebellion if they are excluded by the
majority (Mark Gradstein and Maurice Schiﬀ [2006]). And one can think of xM as the
level of resource expended by the majority in order to undermine the credibility of the
minority’s threat of rebellion. The more resources the minority expend for this purpose,
the more credible their threat of rebellion will be, and, therefore, the higher the share of
public resources its members will be able to control. We therefore denote as
αj =
(xj)
δ nj
R
, (II.3)
7This assumption is particularly relevant when one includes respect for the rule of law and for national
institutions as a constituent of human capital. Marc Gradstein and Moshe Justman [2002] argue that
public investment in education is better than private investment in enhancing the accumulation of these
important constituents of individual human capital.
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the share of public education resources secured by members of population group j, when, as
a group, they allocate an amount xj to exclude (respectively, include) their rivals (respec-
tively, their members) from (respectively, in) the allocation of publicly provided education
resources, where δ ∈ [0, 1] is an endogenous measure of the degree of competition between
population groups comprising the society and
R =
NX
j=1
(xj)
δ nj. (II.4)
As in Esteban and Ray [1999], R is interpreted here as a measure of the intensity of the
intensity of the exclusion contest. Given αj, the share of total public resources secured by
population group j for its members’ use is
θj = αjθ, (II.5)
so that public education resources received by a child i born of a parent who belongs to
population group j are given by
θij =
αjθ
nj
, (II.6)
all i ∈ [0, nj], and all j (j = 1, ...., N). In a society where population groups are segregated,
for example, by place of residence, the share, θij, may be interpreted as the relative quality
of public schools attended by children whose parents belong to population group j.
Assume no free-riding within members of the same population group, so that total
lobbying expenditures by ethnic j are equally shared by all group members. Thus, the
budget constraint faced by the representative member of population group j is given by
the following inequality:
eij + (nj)
−1 xj ≤ (1− t)h1j , (II.7)
all i and all j.
Given the amount, (nj)
−1 xj, contributed to collective action by population group j to
exclude rival groups from sharing in on publicly provided education resources, the objective
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of each parent i, member of population group j, is to choose eij so as to solve the following
problem:
max
eij
h2ij
subject to (II.1), (II.6), and (II.7). Since parents are homogenous within each population
group j, it is clear that they will all choose the same level of parental investment in
child’s education, so that eij = ej, all i. Therefore, since a child’s human capital level
is strictly increasing in the amount of public education resources received, clearly the
budget constraint will be satisfied with equality. Consequently, for each population group
j, participation in the exclusion contest is characterized by the following equation
xj = (1− t)njh1j − ejnj, (II.8)
all j. Hence the trade oﬀ in each child’s human capital between the cost, xj, of excluding
rival population groups’ children and parental investment in own oﬀspring’s human capital.
Thus, the representative parent’s choice of ej determines the extent to which population
group j participates in the exclusion contest. We characterize the determinants of this
participation below.
III. Winners and Losers in the Exclusion Contest
In this subsection we characterize the exclusion contest involving the representative mem-
bers of each of the N population groups comprising the society. In the spirit of Gradstein
and Schiﬀ [2006], and assuming N = 2, on can think of this exclusion contest as a rebel-
lion game between the majority and the minority, in which the minority’s must choose a
level of action aimed at establishing the credibility of its threat of rebellion if excluded
from sharing in on public education resources, given the action taken by the majority to
attempt to undermine this credibility. Since there is no free-riding between same-group
individuals, the exclusion contest will essentially pit the representative members of each
of the population groups comprising the society. In what follows, we study the outcome
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of this contest as a Nash-equilibrium of a non-cooperative game between the respective
representative members.
Denote as player j, the representative member of population group j (with j = 1, ....N).
Let Ej ⊂ <+, denotes the strategy set of player j, with generic element ej. Let E ≡
E1×E2× .....×EN denotes the space of all feasible strategy profiles, with generic element
e. Define a real-valued function V j : E → < by ωj = V j (e), where ωj denotes the payoﬀ
to player j when the strategy profile e = (ej, e−j) is played, and e−j denotes the strategy
profile chosen by the aggregate all players other than player j. From equation (II.1),
substituting in (II.3)-(II.6), and (II.8), rearranging terms, yields player j’s payoﬀ function
as follows:
V j (ej) = Dej +
(wj − ej)δ (nj)1+δPN
l=1 (wl − el)
δ (nl)
1+δ
θ
nj
, (III.1)
all j, where
wj = (1− t)h1j , (III.2)
and θ is as defined in (II.2). Given e−j, player j0s best response satisfies the following
equation
D = (wj − ej)δ−1 (nj)1+δ
P
l 6=j (wj − el)
δ (nl)
1+δhPN
l=1 (wj − el)
δ (nl)
1+δ
i2 δθnj . (III.3)
To solve for the Nash equilibria of this game, we consider two cases: a benchmark case
where all population groups are symmetric and another one where this assumption is
relaxed.
A. Exclusion Contest with Symmetric Exclusion/Inclusion Power
In this subsection, we begin by characterizing the growth eﬀect of social exclusion by
solving a benchmark model where all population groups have equal size (i.e., nj = n all
j) and equal initial wealth (i.e., h1j = h
1, all j). This implies that all population groups
have identical exclusion power. We then investigate, in that context, whether democratic
voting can generate social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity as a political outcome. The
assumption of ethnic symmetry allows us to take full advantage of the computational
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simplicity of symmetric non-cooperative games. Hence the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose nj = n and h1j = h
1, all j. Then, the Nash-equilibrium profile,
e∗ = (e∗1, ..., e
∗
N), is given by
e∗j =
∙
(1− t)− (N − 1) δ
DN
t
¸
h1,
all j.
Proof. A symmetric Nash equilibrium is one where ej = el, all l 6= j. From (III.3),
substituting ej = el rearranging terms, we can rewrite the first order condition as follows:
D =
(N − 1) δθ
N [(1− t)h1 − ej]
,
where θ = th1. Hence the result. QED
As an implication of the above proposition, the equilibrium income of a child when
adult can be rewritten as follows:
h2j = (1− t)Dh1 +
∙
N − (N − 1) δ
N
¸
th1,
all j. Let h¯τ =
PN
j=1 njh
τ
j denotes the τ− generation’s average wealth level, τ ∈ {1, 2} .
Using the assumption of population group symmetry, the gross rate of economic growth in
this economy with social exclusion is thus given by
g =
h¯2
h¯1
= (1− t)D +
∙
N − (N − 1) δ
N
¸
t (III.4)
since, by symmetry, h¯τ = hτ all τ = 1, 2.
A number of observations can be derived from the growth rate expression (III.4). First,
social heterogeneity (i.e., N > 1) has a negative eﬀect on the economic growth of a society
that tolerates social exclusion (i.e., a society where δ > 0). Hence the following proposition:
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Proposition 2. Suppose nj = n and h1j = h
1, all j. Then, in an ethnically diverse
economy (i.e., N > 1), growth is smaller, the higher the degree, δ, of society’s tolerance
for social exclusion.
Second, if δ is suﬃciently high, then an increase in the level of the tax rate financing
public investment in education can actually reduce the growth rate of the economy. Hence
the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Let nj = n and h1j = h
1, all j, and suppose the triplet (δ,D,N) satisfies
(1−D)N
N − 1 < δ ≤ 1, (III.5)
then, public investment in education hinders economic growth.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that
∂g
∂t
< 0,
whenever condition (III.5) holds. This result is obtained by simply diﬀerentiating expres-
sion (III.4) with respect to t. QED
SinceD ∈ (0, 1), condition (III.5) can easily obtain in suﬃciently heterogenous societies.
In particular, as N →∞, this condition converges to 1−D < δ ≤ 1, with D ∈ (0, 1). The
result in Proposition 3 reflects the substitutability between public and private investment
in a child’s human capital. The results of propositions 2 and 3 together suggest that
tolerating social exclusion can be costly to a society. First, tolerance of social exclusion
slows down growth (Proposition 2). Second, if such tolerance is suﬃciently high, it can
even cause public investment in education to become unproductive in a society with a
high degree of heterogeneity (Proposition 3). If so, why would ethnically diverse societies
tolerate it?
Observe that in this benchmark economy studied above, the equilibrium payoﬀ to par-
ticipating in the exclusion contest is identical across population groups, and given by
V¯ j (δ) = (1− t)Dh1 +
∙
N − (N − 1) δ
N
¸
th1
13
all j. Therefore, in a political equilibrium with democratic voting over the level of δ, it is
clear that social exclusion will be rejected in favor of social cohesion, since for all j,
0 = argmax
δ
V¯ j (δ) .
In this benchmark case, all population groups understand that there will be no winner in
the exclusion contest, as in a democracy they all have equal lobbying strength reflected by
equal size and equal economic power. In what follows, we ask whether these results extent
to the case of asymmetric population groups.
B. Asymmetry in Exclusion Power
In this subsection, we relax the assumption of symmetry in exclusion power as captured
by the group size, and attempt to solve for Nash-equilibria of the social exclusion game.
The goal of this exercise is to identify the sources (if any) of political tolerance for social
exclusion. In the interest of simplicity we restrict attention to two population groups,
denoted group M (i.e., the majority group) and group m (i.e., the minority), respectively,
with nm < nM . In other words, N = 2. For simplicity, we let h1 = hj, all j, so that
diﬀerences in group size also captures diﬀerence in lobbying power. In that context, using
(III.1), it can be shown that a Nash-equlibrium profile satisfies the following system of two
equations in two unknown (em, eM):
m :
(w − em)δ (nm)1+δ (w − eM)δ (nM)1+δh
(w − em)δ (nm)1+δ + (w − eM)δ (nM)1+δ
i2 δθD = (w − em)nm (III.6)
M :
(w − em)δ (nm)1+δ (w − eM)δ (nM)1+δh
(w − em)δ (nm)1+δ + (w − eM)δ (nM)1+δ
i2 δθD = (w − eM)nM (III.7)
where w is as defined in (III.2), θ is as defined in (II.2), and nm+nM = 1. Combining the
above first order conditions yields the following arbitrage condition:
(w − em)nm = (w − eM)nM . (III.8)
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Observe that a direct implication of Eq. (III.8) is that as long as population groups have
diﬀerent sizes, i.e. nm 6= nM , all Nash-equilibria are asymmetric in players’ strategies:
ej 6= e−j, all j. hence the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. The unique Nash-equilibrium of this exclusion game is given by
e∗j = w − n−jδθ/D, (III.9)
for all j = m,M .
Proof. Equation (III.8) implies that
(w − em) = (w − eM)
nM
nm
.
Substituting this back into (III.7), rearranging terms then yields the result. QED
Consider expression (II.8). Substituting in (III.9) yields, for a typical member of popu-
lation group j, her per capita investment, κ∗j = x∗j/nj, in the exclusion contest as follows:
κ∗j = n−jδθ/D. (III.10)
Then, observe that in comparison to the ethnic majority, members of the ethnic minority
invest more resources per capita in the exclusion contest:
κ∗m > κ∗M ,
due to the asymmetry in exclusion power (i.e., nM > nm). In other words, to avoid being
totally excluded from the allocation of public education resources, members of the ethnic
minority must allocate relatively more resources per capita in the exclusion contest. As a
result, they end up each diverting more resources away from private investment in their
oﬀspring’s human capital:
e∗m < e
∗
M .
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This result is a direct implication of the power asymmetry (i.e., nM > nm) between the two
population groups comprising the society. We have just proved the following Proposition:
Proposition 4. Tolerance of social exclusion in a context of population group asymmetry
in exclusion power forces members of the ethnic minority to waste relatively more resources,
at the expense of their oﬀspring’s human capital.
How wasteful tolerance of social exclusion will force members of the ethnic minority to
be, depends on the extent of the asymmetry in exclusion power between the two population
groups. We distinguish two cases: (i) nM < wD/δθ; (ii) nM > wD/δθ. In the first case,
the asymmetry in exclusion power is moderate, in the sense that each member of the
minority group can still privately invest in his oﬀspring’s education despite participation
in the exclusion contest: em > 0. In the second case, the asymmetry in exclusion power is
suﬃciently large, in the sense that participation in the exclusion contest precludes private
investment in education for members of ethnic minority: em = 0.
B.1. Case 1: nM < wD/δθ
In this subsection, we address the issue of who gains from supporting social exclusion
when the inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is not too large: nM < wD/δθ. We
first characterize population groups’ equilibrium payoﬀs from participating in the exclusion
contest.
Lemma 2. Let h1M = h
1
m. Suppose nM < wD/δθ. Then, the equilibrium payoﬀ accrued
to the representative member of ethnic j is given by:
Vˆ j (δ) = Dw + [1− n−jδ] θ, (III.11)
all j = m,M.
Proof. Under the condition nM < wD/δθ, it can be shown that both population groups
invest privately in their oﬀspring’s education in order to supplement publicly provided
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education resources. Thus, from (III.1) substituting in (III.9), rearranging terms yields the
result. QED
A number of observations can be derived from Eq. (III.11). First, the majority group
is the contest winner:
for all δ, Vˆ M (δ) > Vˆ m (δ) .
The second observation is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose 1/2 < nM < wD/δθ. Then neither the minority group nor the
majority benefit from supporting tolerance for social exclusion.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that for all j = m,M ,
0 = argmax
δ
Vˆ j (δ) .
This can be done by observing from (III.11) that the function Vˆ j (.) is strictly decreasing
for all j = m,M . Hence the result. QED
That this result hold for the ethnic minority is straightforward because tolerance of so-
cial exclusion causes members of that group to become relatively more resource-wasteful,
which, by backward induction, leads them to propose a zero-tolerance policy for this phe-
nomenon. For this result to hold for the contest winner as well is less straightforward.
Yet, the reason the majority group also rejects social exclusion is quite intuitive. Ex-
cluding the minority group from sharing in on public resources entails both costs (wasted
resources) and benefits measured by the share of resources captured by the group. When
the inter-group asymmetry is moderate in the sense that 1/2 < nM < wD/δθ, this reduces
the benefit the majority derives from excluding the minority from the allocation of public
education resources. For example when the exclusion contest takes the form of a rebel-
lion game between the majority and the minority, condition 1/2 < nM < wD/δθ implies
that the majority is not large enough to be able to undermine the the minority’s threat
of rebellion, in the sense that the per capita cost of undermining the credibility of this
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threat exceeds its per capita benefits. Hence, the majority’s lack of support for social ex-
clusion. The above Proposition implies that in societies where the inter-group asymmetry
in exclusion/inclusion power is moderate enough, the introduction of democratic voting is
suﬃcient to eliminate social exclusion.
B.2. Case 2: nM ≥ wD/δθ > 1/2
In this subsection, we revisit the issue of who gains from supporting social exclusion in the
case where the inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is relatively large: nM ≥ wD/δθ.
In that case, the asymmetry in exclusion power is such that participating in the exclusion
contest forces the minority group to give up on supplementing public resources with private
investment in child’s human capital. In other words, em = 0, while eM > 0. We begin with
the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let h1M = h
1
m. Suppose
nM ≥ wD/δθ > nm. (III.12)
Then, the equilibrium payoﬀ accrued to each member of ethnic j is given by:
V ∗j (δ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
θ/ [nm + φ (δ)nM ] for j = m
Dw + ψ (δ) θ for j =M
, (III.13)
where
φ (δ) =
∙
δtnM
(1− t)D
¸δ
, (III.14)
ψ (δ) =
1
nM + [φ (δ)]
−1 nm
− nmδ. (III.15)
Proof. The result simply follows from substituting expressions (III.9) into (III.1), using
condition (III.12), and rearranging terms. QED
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Expression (III.13) characterizes each population group’s payoﬀ from living in a society
that has a degree, δ, of tolerance for social exclusion. In order to understand who gains
and who loses from supporting social exclusion, we again ask each individual to make a
proposal on the level that δ should take in the society. Our results are summarized by the
following Proposition:
Proposition 6. Let h1M = h
1
m. Suppose nM ≥ wD/δθ > nm. Then, only the majority
group gains from supporting social exclusion.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that the function V ∗m (.) is strictly decreasing in δ, while
V ∗M (.) is strictly increasing in δ.
Claim 1. V ∗m (.) is a strictly decreasing function
Proof of Claim 1. To show that V ∗m (.) is a strictly decreasing function, it suﬃces
to show that φ (.) is a strictly increasing function, i.e., φ0 (δ) > 0. To see this, let ϕ (δ) =
logφ (δ),where φ (δ) is as defined in (III.14). Then, it can be shown that
ϕ0 (δ) = 1 + log
∙
δtnM
(1− t)D
¸
> 0, since nM ≥ wD/δθ.
Hence φ0 (δ) = ϕ0 (δ)φ (δ) > 0. This completes the proof.
Claim 2. V ∗M (.) is a strictly increasing function
Proof of Claim 2. The proof follows in two steps. First, we establish analytically
that V ∗M (.) is at least non-decreasing in δ. Then we show numerically that V ∗M (.) is
indeed strictly increasing in δ.
Diﬀerentiate (III.15) with respect to δ to get
ψ0 (δ) =
φ0 (δ)nm
[φ (δ)nM + nm]
2 − nm.
Next, to show that ψ0 (δ) > 0, it suﬃces to establish that
φ0 (δ) ≥ [φ (δ)nM + nm]2 .
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Since by construction φ0 (δ) = ϕ0 (δ)φ (δ) , the above inequality reduces to
∙
1 +
1
δ
log φ (δ)
¸
φ (δ) ≥ [φ (δ)nM + nm]2 . (III.16)
Now, suppose by way of contradiction that inequality (III.16) does not hold for nM ≥
wD/δθ. Then, observe that as nM → wD/δθ, it is clear that φ (δ)→ 1, so that [φ (δ)nM + nm]2 →
1, since nM + nm = 1, and ∙
1 +
1
δ
logφ (δ)
¸
φ (δ)→ 1,
which is clearly a contradiction.
Next, we solve two numerical examples to illustrate that V ∗M (.) is strictly increasing
in δ.
Delta
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Figure 1-a:     t = 0.15 Figure 1-b:  t = 0.20
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In Figure 1-a, the tax rate is chosen at t = .15, which set nM = .90, in order for
condition (III.12) to be satisfied. In Figure 1-b, the tax rate is raised at t = .20, which set
nM = .75 in order for condition (III.12) to hold. In both cases, the value function V ∗M (.)
is strictly increasing for values of δ chosen in the interval [.65, 1]. Values of δ < .65 are
inconsistent with condition (III.12). Hence the result. QED
Condition (III.12) states that the majority group’s relative population size is suﬃciently
large. It implies that for the majority, the benefits of excluding the rival group exceed its
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costs, while the reverse is true for the minority group. As a result, only the former gains
from supporting society’s tolerance for social exclusion. In such a society, therefore, one
would expect political candidates to have ethnic, religious or racial-based constituencies,
and social exclusion will thrive under democratic voting. Our analysis replicates Grad-
stein’s [2003] result only in cases where inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is suﬃ-
ciently large. So when population groups have equal size, or when the asymmetry in sizes
is not too large, democratic voting can eliminate social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity,
religion, or race. This is because in that case, all population groups anticipate that the
intensity of exclusion contest will be too high, so that the costs of excluding rival popu-
lation groups will exceed its benefits. However, when the inter-group size asymmetry is
suﬃciently large, then democratic voting can yield political support for social exclusion.
This is because for members of the majority, the per capita cost of excluding the minority
group is smaller, the smaller the relative population size of the minority. In order words,
the higher (respectively, the smaller) the size of the majority (respectively, the minority),
the more able (respectively, less able) will each of its members be to supplement public
investment by private investment. For members of the majority, this will raise the benefits
of exclusion, while lowering its costs. Hence the majority’s political support for society’s
tolerance of social exclusion, in a democratic environment.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the political determinants of soci-
eties tolerance for social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or race. We developed
a political-economic model where society’s degree of tolerance for social exclusion obtains as
a political equilibrium under democratic voting. Echoing the existing economics literature
on the eﬀects of social exclusion, we find that indeed social exclusion is harmful to growth.
On the issue of whether democratic voting can support the emergence of social exclusion
as a political equilibrium, we find two types of answers depending on the context. More
specifically, we find that in a context where ethnic, religious, or racial groups are either
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symmetric in exclusion power–or, when they are asymmetric, the degree of inter-group
asymmetry in exclusion power is relatively moderate–, then no group gains from support-
ing tolerance of social exclusion. Only in societies where the inter-group asymmetry in
exclusion power is suﬃciently large, would the more powerful group gain from supporting
tolerance of social exclusion. Our analysis therefore suggests that while democratic vot-
ing in ethnically diverse societies with relatively low level of population group asymmetry
in exclusion power can be suﬃcient to eliminate social exclusion, it may, in contrast, ac-
tually generate social exclusion as a political outcome in societies where the inter-group
asymmetry in exclusion power is suﬃciently large.
Another important result of this paper is that the majority’s political support for social
exclusion is increasing in its exclusion power. This exclusion power, in turn, is determined
by the relative size of the minority, as the latter aﬀects the cost to the majority of excluding
the minority. Our analysis therefore suggests that an immigration policy aimed at reducing
the majority’s exclusion power combines with the introduction of democratic voting to
represent an eﬀective weapon against social exclusion.
These results where obtained in a framework where investment in child’s human capital
has two perfectly substitutable components: a private component controlled by the parent
and a public component controlled by a government endowed with the power of taxation.
This double sourcing of human capital inputs was the distinguishing feature of our model.
With respect to Mark Gradstein [2003], this double sourcing allowed us to obtain persis-
tence of social exclusion without appealing to within group human capital spillovers. With
respect to Mark Gradstein and Maurice Schiﬀ [2006], this double sourcing allowed us to
endogenize the credibility of the threat of rebellion by the minority. Because of our focus
on endogenizing the costs and benefits of social exclusion, we restricted attention to a case
where the exclusion power of the majority is determined solely by its size. Consideration
of income or wealth asymmetry either as an alternative source of exclusion power or as an
important component of that power, in our opinion, would add no new qualitative insights
to the analysis.
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